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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, presiding. Judgment 
was entered on August 10, 1987, and was amended on September 8, 
1987. The amended judgment was in defendant-respondent 
Robinson Brick Company?s favor on all claims and its 
counterclaim. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter 
of law, that Beehive Brick Company's "million brick order" was 
not supported by a written memorandum within the meaning of the 
statute of frauds? 
2. Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter 
of law, that the alleged oral contract for a distributorship 
was unsupported by a written memorandum as required by the 
statute of frauds? 
3. Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter 
of law, that there must be an enforceable contract to support a 
claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
4. Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter 
of law, that Robinson Brick Company has not interfered with 
Beehive Brick Company's customer contracts? 
5. Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter 
of law, that Beehive Brick Company never provided Robinson 
Brick Company with goods or services? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann, § 70A-1-203: 
Obligation of good faith. Every contract or duty 
within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or enforcement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201: 
Formal requirements - Statute of frauds. (1) Except 
as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale 
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by 
way of action or defense unless there is some writing 
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A 
writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly 
states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable 
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such 
writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a 
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against 
the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to 
know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection 
(1) against such party unless written notice of objection to 
its contents is given within ten days after it is received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other 
respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially 
manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for 
sale to others in the ordinary course of the sellerTs 
business and the seller, before notice of repudiation 
is received and under circumstances which reasonably 
indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made 
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either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or 
commitments for their procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise 
in court that a contract for sale was made, but the 
contract is not enforceable under this provision 
beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has 
been made and accepted or which have been received and 
accepted (section 70A-2-606). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-206: 
Offer and acceptance in formation of contract. 
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the 
language or circumstances 
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be 
construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by 
any medium reasonable in the circumstances; 
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for 
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship 
or by the prompt or current shipment of non-conforming 
goods, but such a shipment of nonconforming goods does 
not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably 
notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only 
as an accommodation to the buyer. 
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is 
a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified 
of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as 
having lapsed before acceptance. 
Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the 
court determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award 
just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable 
attorney fees, to the prevailing party. 
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(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate 
representation. The court may impose appropriate sanctions 
against any counsel who inadequately represents a client on 
appeal. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in part): 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion 
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing* The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
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but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant Beehive Brick Company (hereinafter 
"Beehive") commenced this action in the Third Judicial District 
Court on August 8, 1986, claiming that defendant-respondent 
Robinson Brick Company (hereinafter "Robinson") breached 
contract obligations and caused damage to Beehive. (R. 2-8) 
On September 17, 1986 Robinson counterclaimed, alleging that 
Beehive's open account in the amount of $29,393.01 was past 
due. (R. 20-21) Following discovery, Robinson moved for 
summary judgment in its favor as to all of the claims appearing 
in the complaint and as to Robinson's counterclaim. 
(R. 32-35) On August 10, 1987, the District Court granted 
Robinson's motion in its entirety. (R. 75-77) Subsequently, 
the court entered an amended summary judgment that adjusted the 
rate of interest on the counterclaim judgment. (R. 86-88) 
Beehive filed its notice of appeal on September 16, 1987. 
(R. 91-92) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Robinson seeks an order of the Court affirming the 
judgment of the District Court. Robinson also seeks to recover 
attorneys' fees incurred in responding to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The statement of facts appearing in Beehive's brief 
misstates or distorts important facts and omits many undisputed 
facts which were dispositive of the issues before the District 
Court. Robinson offers the following brief statement of facts. 
1. Beehive's Temporary Distributorship With Robinson. 
In April 1985, Beehive contacted Robinson regarding 
the possibility of its selling bricks manufactured by Robinson 
in Denver, Colorado. (RB 95 at 18; R. 94 at 30) In response 
to this request, Robinson granted Beehive a temporary 
distributorship. (R. 95 at 18; R. 96 at 75-77; R. 94 at 38) 
Pursuant to this temporary arrangement, Beehive bought goods on 
account from Robinson and then resold them to Beehive's 
customers in Utah. (R. 96 at 46-48) Robinson agreed to supply 
Beehive with bricks until Robinson could appoint a permanent 
distributor for its products in Utah. (R. 95 at 18; R. 96 at 
75-77; R. 94 at 38) From April 1985 until July 1985, in 
response to orders placed in writing by Beehive, Robinson sold 
bricks to Beehive on account. (R. 96 at 46-48 & Ex. 16) 
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In July 1985, Robinson told Beehive that the temporary 
distributorship would be terminated because Interstate Brick 
Company had been selected as Robinson1s distributor in Utah. 
(R. 96 at 81-82 & Ex. 13; R. 94 at 45) To allow Beehive a 
transition period to meet all of its commitments for Robinson's 
products, Robinson allowed Beehive until October 15, 1985 to 
place bona fide orders for bricks from Robinson; Robinson 
advised Beehive that it would not accept new orders after that 
date. (R. 95 at 22-23; R. 96 at 82; R. 94 at 45) 
In its brief to the Court, Beehive contends that in 
March 1986, Robinson promised Beehive it would be awarded a 
non-exclusive distributorship for Robinson products. (R. 95 at 
55-56) Robinsonfs representative denies ever having promised 
Beehive a distributorship beyond the temporary distributorship 
in effect during the spring and summer of 1985. (R. 94 at 75) 
But more significantly for purposes of the District Court's 
ruling, according to Beehive's representative, Robinson never 
agreed in writing to grant Beehive a distributorship in 1986. 
(R. 95 at 54-56) 
2. Beehive's Alleged Order of One Million Bricks. 
One day before the end of the phase-out period of the 
temporary distributorship, Dee Young, Beehive's sales manager, 
advised Monte Jones, Robinson's manager of distributor sales, 
that Beehive wished to purchase approximately one million 
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bricks from Robinson composed of bricks of a certain color and 
texture that would have to be developed specifically for 
Beehive's customer. (R. 96 at 84-86; R. 95 at 23-28; R. 94 at 
49-51) At the time this order was placed, the price for one 
million bricks was more than $500. (R. 96 at Ex. 8-11) In the 
Court below, Beehive contended that, if the special color and 
texture could not successfully be manufactured, it would have 
accepted bricks kept in stock (R. 96 at 84-86). In any event, 
however, both parties knew that Robinson was supposed to 
attempt to produce a brick of a texture and color that had not 
been produced by Robinson for several years, called "Provincial 
Antique." (R. 94 at 73-75) 
Beehive claims to have sent Robinson an order in 
writing for the so-called one million brick order. (R. 96 at 
29 & Ex. 7) Robinson claims not to have received any written 
order. (R. 94 at 51) Robinson's manager of distributor sales, 
however, discussed Beehive's desire for one million bricks over 
the telephone. (R. 94 at 49, 51, 71) The writing which 
Beehive allegedly sent to Robinson to order the one million 
bricks was a Beehive purchase order form. Beehive's form 
stated: "[This purchase order] must be confirmed in writing by 
authorized selling agent from vendor's office." (R. 96 at 
Ex. 7) The alleged million brick order was never confirmed in 
writing by Robinson -- there exists no writing by which 
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Robinson confirmed that it would provide the million bricks to 
Beehive, that it would do so over a period of one year, or that 
it would be able to produce the type of bricks that Beehive 
wished it to produce. (R. 96 at 54 & Ex. 1-16; R. 94 at 81-82) 
Between October 1985 and February 1986, Robinson 
attempted on three separate occasions to manufacture bricks of 
a color and texture that would be satisfactory to Beehive and 
its customer. Specifically, in November 1986, Robinson made a 
test run of 50,000 Provincial Antique bricks, sending a sample 
to Beehive. In January 1986, Robinson made another test run of 
150,000 Provincial Antique bricks, again sending a sample to 
Beehive. In late January and early February 1986, Robinson 
completed a third test run of 200,000 Provincial Antique 
bricks, again sending a sample to Beehive. (R. 95 at 41-46; 
R. 94 at 73-74) All of the test runs manufactured by Robinson 
were unsatisfactory to Beehive for purposes of fulfilling the 
million brick order. (R. 95 at 41-46; R. 96 at 88; R. 94 at 
73-74) 
Following these three unsuccessful attempts to 
manufacture a satisfactory brick for Beehive's million brick 
order, on April 17, 1986, Robinson advised Beehive that it was 
unable to produce the type of Provincial Antique brick that 
Beehive and its customer wished. (R. 96 at 90-92 & Ex. 14) 
Robinson told Beehive, however, that it would allow Beehive to 
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take delivery until May 16, 1986 of other types of brick in 
Robinson's inventory as a substitute for the Provincial Antique 
bricks. (R. 96 at 90-92 & Ex. 14) Robinson also told Beehive 
that it would have until May 16, 1986 to pick up all of its 
remaining orders with Robinson. (R. 96 at 90-92 & Ex. 14) 
3. Events Following Termination of the Distributorship. 
After the relationship between Robinson and Beehive 
terminated on April 17, 1986, Beehive never attempted to fill 
the million brick order with another type of brick as a 
substitute for the Provincial Antique bricks (R. 95 at 66), 
although Beehive now claims that the substitute brick would 
have been satisfactory from the beginning. (Appellant's Brief 
at 7) 
As to Beehive's claims that Robinson caused Interstate 
Brick to approach Emerson Larkin (Beehive's customer) in an 
attempt to fill the one million brick order previously placed 
by Beehive, the record does not support this assertion. 
Rather, Beehive's president, Randall Browning, testified that 
he had no personal knowledge of any effort by Robinson to 
interfere with Beehive's contracts with customers. (R. 96 at 
118-19) Robinson's manager of distributor sales stated 
unequivocally that Robinson did not contact Beehive's customers 
in an effort to direct their business away from Beehive. 
(R. 94 at 69) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Beehive claims that Robinson violated two alleged 
contracts. Specifically, Beehive claims that Robinson breached 
an agreement to supply Beehive with one million bricks of a 
certain color, texture and type. Beehive also claims that 
Robinson broke a promise to grant Beehive a non-exclusive 
distributorship for Robinson products. Beehive urges this 
Court to find disputed factual issues relating to the existence 
of, and compliance with, these two alleged agreements. 
Beehive's argument must fail for one simple reason: both of 
the alleged agreements lack the support of a written memorandum 
required by the statute of frauds. Therefore, in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (1987), the alleged contracts 
are not enforceable as a matter of law. 
Beehive also claims that Robinson's failure to perform 
the agreements in the time, place and manner required 
constitutes a violation of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing inherent in all contracts, codified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 (1987). It is fundamental, however, 
that good faith in the making of a contract is not required by 
section 1-203 of the commercial code. Beehive's argument fails 
as a matter of law. 
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Beehive's final two arguments fail on the facts. 
Beehive argues that there exist questions of fact regarding 
actions by Robinson which have interfered with Beehive's 
ability to perform its contracts. Beehive also contends that 
Robinson has been unjustly enriched by benefits which Beehive 
has conferred upon Robinson. However, Beehive has completely 
failed to offer any specific facts to support these 
assertions. Under Rule 56(e), Beehive may not rest upon 
allegations in its pleadings but must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for 
trial. Beehive failed to demonstrate the existence of a 
material and disputed fact relevant to these two issues, and 
summary judgment was correctly entered. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
THE "MILLION BRICK ORDER" IS BARRED FROM ENFORCEMENT BY 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Beehive claims that Robinson breached an agreement to 
supply Beehive with one million bricks of a certain color, 
texture and type. (R. 2.) Beehive urges this Court 
(Appellant's Brief at 11-22) to find disputed factual issues 
relating to the existence of, and compliance with, the alleged 
agreement. Specifically, Beehive argues there exists a factual 
dispute as to whether an order for one million bricks was 
placed by Beehive and accepted by Robinson and/or confirmed in 
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writing by Robinson, and whether the test sample of bricks 
provided to Beehive by Robinson constituted partial performance 
of the contract. All of these issues, however, raise questions 
of law, not fact, and were properly decided on summary judgment 
by the District Court. It is significant that Beehive has not 
cited a single case authority in support of its position on 
these legal issues. All of the available authority contradicts 
Beehive's position. 
Beehive's first purported question of fact relates to 
the so-called million brick order placed by Beehive. Although 
the parties dispute much of what transpired regarding this 
order (such as whether the written order was ever received by 
Robinson and the date of delivery required by the order) two 
facts are undisputed. First, the writing which Beehive claims 
as the order was typed on a Beehive Brick purchase order form. 
(R. 96 at 29 and Ex. 7; Appellant's Brief at 12-13) Second, 
the writing which Beehive claims confirms this order is a 
letter dated April 17, 1986 from Monte S. Jones of Robinson 
Brick Company to Randall Browning of Beehive Brick. (R. 61; 
Appellant's Brief at 13-14) These writings are insufficient 
within the meaning of the statute of frauds to support a 
finding of an enforceable contract, as a matter of law. 
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The statute of frauds in the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code requires that for a contract for the sale of goods for the 
price of $500 or more to be enforceable, two elements must be 
satisfied: 1) there must exist an oral agreement, and 2) the 
oral agreement must be reflected in a writing or a confirming 
memorandum. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (1987). The million 
brick order fails on both counts. 
Any obligation that Robinson had to supply Beehive 
with one million bricks was contingent with its being able to 
produce a brick acceptable to Beehive's customer. (R. 94 at 
73-75) However, the parties never reached an agreement as to 
an acceptable color, texture and type of brick to fulfill the 
million brick order. Between October 1985 and February 1986, 
Robinson attempted on three separate occasions to manufacture 
bricks that would be satisfactory to Beehive and its customer. 
(R. 95 at 41-46; R. 94 at 73-74) All of the test runs 
manufactured by Robinson were unsatisfactory to Beehive and its 
customer for purposes of fulfilling the million brick order. 
(R. 95 at 41-46; R. 96 at 88; R. 94 at 73-74) The parties 
simply never reached an oral agreement as to a brick acceptable 
for purposes of the million brick order. 
Moreover, the "agreement," if any, between the parties 
was never reduced to a writing sufficient to satisfy the 
statute of frauds. Although Beehive claims to have sent 
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Robinson a purchase order, the purchase order was never 
confirmed in writing by Robinson, Beehive's purchase order 
itself is not a "confirmation" within the meaning of section 
70A-2-201(2) because the purchase order stated that it "must be 
confirmed in writing by authorized selling agent from vendor's 
office," (R. 96 at Ex. 7). Courts construing this provision 
of the U.C.C. have routinely held that a purchase order from 
the buyer is insufficient against the seller where the purchase 
order itself explicitly anticipates a confirmatory memorandum. 
For example, in Nations Enterprises, Inc. v. Process 
Equipment Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1978), the 
seller agreed orally to supply special-order goods. The buyer 
sent a purchase order that said it was not valid until 
confirmed in writing by the seller. The seller did not confirm 
in writing but supplied a portion of the goods. The buyer sued 
for breach of contract as to the remaining goods. The court 
held, however, that the claim was barred by the statute of 
frauds: 
[The Buyer] also argues that its purchase order 
is at least a confirmatory memorandum within the 
meaning of [U.C.C. § 2-201(2)] which is 
sufficient to bind [the seller] since written 
objection to its contents was not received within 
ten days . . . . [T]o constitute a sufficient 
writing to take the oral contract outside the 
statute of frauds, the writing must be "in 
confirmation of the contract." Here, the 
purchase order does not confirm that a contract 
has been made. [Citations omitted] Rather, the 
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purchase order, on its face, recognizes that 
something more must be done before a contract 
could come into existence. 
579 P. 2d at 858. Other courts have reached the same 
conclusion. E.g., Great Western Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut 
Co., 721 F.2d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 1983); FMC Finance Corp. v. 
Reed, 592 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1979); American Web 
Press, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 596 F.Supp. 1089, 1093 (D. Colo. 
1983); N. Dorman & Co., Inc. v. Noon Hour Food Products, Inc., 
501 F.Supp. 294, 297-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Intf1 Commodities 
Export Co. v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. 
687 (1981). 
Furthermore, Robinson's April 17, 1986 letter also 
fails to satisfy the requirements for a confirming memorandum 
under the statute of frauds because the writing did not 
indicate that a contract had been made between the parties. To 
the contrary, the letter stated that the order for a special 
color of bricks could not be fulfilled. (R. 61) Thus, the 
letter is insufficient as a confirming memorandum under 
subsections 1 and 2 of the statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-201 (1987). The letter is also insufficient under 
subsection 3(a) of the statute of frauds, for specially 
manufactured goods, which according to its terms only applies 
when the seller of the goods, not the buyer, seeks to obviate 
the statute of frauds defense. Global Truck & Equipment Co., 
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Inc. v. Palmer Machine Works, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 641, 648 (N.D. 
Miss. 1986). 
Beehive also argues that the test samples of bricks 
provided to Beehive by Robinson constituted partial performance 
of the contract -- or at least raised disputed questions of 
fact foreclosing summary judgment. Beehive's argument seems to 
be that if it accepted the sample goods, then there was an 
enforceable contract under Section 70A-2-206, notwithstanding 
the requirements of the statute of frauds. Beehive's 
contention that section 70A-2-206 works as an exception to the 
statute of frauds rule found in section 70A-2-201 is completely 
without merit. By its terms, section 70A-2-201 is qualified 
only as provided in that section, and not by other sections of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Furthermore, the statute of 
frauds provision itself addresses the part-performance 
question. Section 70A-2-201(3)(c) permits enforcement of an 
otherwise unenforceable contract with respect to goods already 
received and accepted. However, this exception applies only to 
that portion of the contract actually performed and does not 
take the entire contract out of the statute of frauds; that is, 
it validates the oral agreement only as to those goods actually 
received and accepted by the buyer. Bagby Land & Cattle Co. 
v. California Livestock ComTn Co., 439 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 
1971); Spierling v. Fairmont Foods Co., 424 F.2d 337, 340 (7th 
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Cir. 1980); Jessen v. Ashland Recreation Assoc, 204 Neb. 19, 
281 N.W.2d 210, 213 (1979). This exception allows Robinson to 
enforce its counterclaim for payment as to goods actually 
received and accepted by Beehive (which issue was not appealed 
by Beehive), but does not take the entire contract out of the 
statute of frauds. See Nations Enterprises, 40 Colo. App. 
390, 579 P.2d at 658. 
Beehive's claim that Robinson breached an agreement to 
supply Beehive with one million bricks is barred as a matter of 
law. The parties never reached an oral agreement as to an 
acceptable color, texture and type of brick to fulfill the 
million brick order. Even if there was an oral agreement, it 
was never reduced to a writing and there exists no confirming 
memorandum within the meaning of the statute of frauds. 
Finally, part performance of the contract validates the oral 
agreement only as to those goods actually received and accepted 
by the buyer, but does take the entire agreement out of the 
statute of frauds. The District Court correctly held that the 
"million brick order" is barred by the statute of frauds. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT FOR A DISTRIBUTORSHIP IS 
UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Beehive claims that Robinson broke an agreement to 
grant Beehive a non-exclusive distributorship for Robinson 
products. (R. 4-5) Beehive offers two documents in support of 
its claim: a letter from Monte S. Jones dated July 22, 1985 and 
the April 17, 1986 letter. (Appellant's Brief at 23-24) Both 
of these documents are inadequate as a matter of law under the 
statute of frauds. Again, Beehive has not offered the Court a 
single case in support of its position. 
In Utah, as in other jurisdictions, a distributorship 
agreement covering the sale of goods is governed by Article 2 
of Utah's Uniform Commercial Code. Quality Performance Lines, 
Inc. v. Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 
1980). As noted in Point I, supra, for a writing to satisfy 
the statute of frauds found in Article 2 of the Commercial 
Code, it must evidence the existence of an oral agreement. If 
it does not evidence a contract which has already come into 
being, it is not a legally sufficient memorandum of agreement; 
in the words of section 70A-2-201(l), the writing must 
"indicate that a contract for sale has been made." See 3 
Bender's U.C.C. Service § 2.04[1], at 2-51 (1987). In short, 
although the statute of frauds does not require a writing which 
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embodies all the essential terms of a contract, it does require 
some writing that indicates that a contract for sale has been 
made. 
Neither of the documents offered by Beehive confirmed 
that a contract or agreement of a permanent, non-exclusive 
distributorship had been made. Rather, the July 22, 1985 
letter terminated the temporary distributorship relationship 
without reference to any other agreement. Similarly, the 
April 17,> 1986 letter stated that the temporary distributorship 
"must be entirely broken at this time." The documents did not 
indicate that an agreement to grant Beehive a non-exclusive 
distributorship had been reached, and they are therefore 
inadequate under the statute of frauds as a matter of law. 
See 3 Bender's U.C.C. Service § 2.04[1], at 2-51 and cases 
cited therein. 
Beehive also claims that Robinson's admission of the 
temporary distributorship arrangement took the alleged 
agreement concerning a permanent distributorship out of the 
statute of frauds by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A~2-201(3)(b) (1987). Apparently, Beehive argues that the 
temporary distributorship and the permanent, non-exclusive 
distributorship were one and the same, and that by admitting 
that a temporary distributorship was granted, Robinson also 
admitted that the non-exclusive distributorship was also agreed 
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upon. This simply is not true as a factual matter, and finds 
no support in the record. In fact, Beehive's officers 
testified they understood that, although they were granted a 
temporary distributorship in the Spring of 1985, at some point 
a new exclusive distributor would be appointed. (R. 96 at 
75-76; R. 95 at 18-22) 
Beehive's claim that Robinson broke an agreement to 
grant Beehive a non-exclusive distributorship for Robinson 
products is barred as a matter of law. There exists no writing 
within the meaning of the statute of frauds to support 
Beehive's claim. Robinson's admissions concerning the 
temporary distributorship have no bearing on the alleged 
permanent distributorship at issue in this case. The District 
Court correctly held that the purported oral agreement for a 
non-exclusive distributorship is barred from enforcement by the 
statute of frauds. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
THERE MUST BE AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM 
OF BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
In the Second Cause of Action of its complaint, 
Beehive alleged that Robinson breached "the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inherent in all contracts." (R. 4) As 
the factual basis for this contention, Beehive claimed that 
Robinson "induced [Beehive] to expend time, money and other 
-17-
resources in the development and cultivation of a client basis 
. • . and then refused to allow [Beehive] to meet said 
contractual obligation to its clients and customers/' (Id.) 
In its brief to this Court, Beehive states that this claim was 
intended to hold Robinson accountable for "those dealings which 
exist prior to the formalization of the contract," and 
specifically for Robinson's conduct during contract 
negotiations. (Appellant's Brief at 26) It is again 
significant that Beehive does not support its legal position 
with a single case authority. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inherent in contracts for the sale of goods is codified at 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 (1987). (R. 4) It is fundamental 
that a party's conduct in the making of a contract cannot be 
held to violate this section of the Uniform Commercial Code 
because, under the statute, the duty of good faith relates to 
the contract's "performance or enforcement." As one 
commentator explained: 
[T]he [good faith] standard is applicable to the 
"performance and enforcement" of the contract, 
which presumably excludes the matter of its 
making. It is not a test to be used, for 
example, when a fact known to one party but not 
to the other is withheld at the time of executing 
the agreement and there is no duty to disclose. 
Such a fact may be important in considering 
whether the transaction is unconscionable or not, 
but the failure to disclose it to the other, even 
when it is known that the other party would not 
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enter the contract if he had knowledge of the 
fact, would not of itself be a failure to meet 
the Code's standard of good faith. 
3 Bender's U.C.C. Service § 4.08[3], at 4-252 (1987). The 
Utah Supreme Court has found a duty of good faith performance 
only where there is an enforceable contract relation. See, 
e.g., Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
306 (Utah 1982); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 
505 (Utah 1980); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975). Beehive's brief to this Court does not 
explain how a covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be 
implied in a contract that is not itself enforceable. 
As established in points I and II supra, the alleged 
agreements from which this cause stems are barred from 
enforcement by the statute of frauds. As a matter of law, 
therefore, there exists no contract to support such an implied 
obligation. The District Court properly dismissed Beehive's 
argument; its theory has no support in law or in fact. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
ROBINSON DID NOT INTERFERE WITH BEEHIVE'S ABILITY TO 
PERFORM ITS CONTRACTS. 
Beehive argues that there exist disputed questions of 
fact whether Robinson interfered with Beehive's ability to 
perform its contracts with customers. Beehive quotes a portion 
of the testimony of Randall Browning in support of this claim 
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(Appellant's Brief at 27), but leaves out the most critical 
point. The complete testimony on this issue follows: 
(Q) My question to you, Mr. Browning, is whether you 
have personal knowledge of any instance in which 
Robinson Brick has instructed any of its 
authorized agents to contact your customers. 
A. My response would be that the only instance that 
we're referring to there is with Emerson Larkin„ 
He was contacted by Interstate Brick the day 
following us being cut off as a distributor and 
was asked to give his million brick order that he 
had previously given to Beehive Brick, to 
Interstate Brick and I think that the only source 
that that could come from would be Robinson Brick. 
Q. You suppose that to be the case; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't have personal knowledge of any 
communications between Robinson Brick and 
Interstate Brick on that subject? 
A. No, I don't. 
R. 96 at 118. 
Under Rule 56(e), a party opposing summary judgment 
may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials in his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
[Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial." If the opposing party does not 
respond with specific facts properly supported, "summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(e); see, e.g., Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 
224 (Utah 1983); Thomock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). 
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That is precisely what happened in this case. Beehive 
offered no evidence to support its assertion that Robinson 
interfered with business relations between Beehive and its 
customers. Beehive failed to demonstrate the existence of a 
material and disputed factual issue, and judgment was correctly 
entered by the District Court. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
BEEHIVE NEVER PROVIDED ROBINSON WITH GOODS OR SERVICES. 
Beehive's final argument also fails on the facts. 
Beehive contends (Appellant's Brief at 28-29) that Robinson was 
unjustly enriched by benefits which Beehive conferred upon 
Robinson. The "benefit" conferred upon Robinson amounted to 
this: Beehive purchased bricks from Robinson and distributed 
them in Utah. The testimony of Beehive's president on the 
issue was as follows: 
(Q) My question to [you] is . . . what goods and 
services, if any, did your company provide to 
Robinson Brick Company? 
A, We did not provide goods. We did provide orders 
to them for brick, for which they had agreed to 
compensate us. 
Q. Well, isn't the usual way when you place an order 
as a purchaser for the purchaser to pay the 
seller rather than the seller to pay the 
purchaser? 
A. Yes, that's probably true. 
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Q. Anything else besides orders that you provided to 
them? Any other services that you provided to 
Robinson Brick Company? 
A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 
(R. 96 at 116-17) 
As this testimony indicates, Beehive did not act as 
Robinson's agent in performing services on its behalf. To the 
contrary, Beehive bought bricks from Robinson and resold them 
to its own customers. If (as Beehive's argument implies) every 
purchaser of goods from a manufacturer is entitled to 
remuneration for this "service," the commercial relationship 
would be turned on its headc Again, Beehive does not cite a 
single authority that would support its novel argument. There 
is no factual basis for Beehive's contention that Robinson was 
unjustly enriched as a result of the distributorship. 
Beehive also argues that because it allegedly made a 
special effort in order to win a permanent distributorship, 
Robinson has somehow been unjustly enriched. That Beehive 
worked to win a permanent distributorship, however, is of no 
consequence. If it sold more bricks as a result of these 
efforts, presumably it was paid for them by its customers. The 
record is silent concerning any tangible benefit conferred on 
Robinson as the result of these efforts. (R. 96 at 116-17) 
Whether a party was unjustly enriched is determined by the 
value of the benefit conferred on the defendant; neither the 
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detriment incurred by the plaintiff nor the reasonable value of 
the plaintiff's services is relevant, Davies v. Olson, 70 
Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 45 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Under Rule 56(e), Beehive may not rest upon mere 
allegations but must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact. Beehive has failed 
to demonstrate the existence of a material and disputed fact 
relevant to this issue. The District Court did not err in 
holding that Robinson was not unjustly enriched, as a matter of 
law. 
VI. ROBINSON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS1 FEES INCURRED IN 
RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
Robinson hereby requests its attorneys' fees incurred 
in responding to this appeal. Attorneys1 fees are 
appropriately awarded when an appeal taken is frivolous. R. 
Utah Ct. App. 33(a). For purposes of Rule 33(a), a "frivolous 
appeal" is one having no reasonable legal or factual basis, 
that is, one that is not well grounded in fact or warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law. O'Brien v. Rush, 
744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987). 
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Beehive has made no effort to support its contentions 
on appeal. Beehive cites no legal authority to support its 
position on the merits of claims before the Court, and Points 
IV and V of Beehive's argument have no basis in the factual 
record. Beehivefs claims are not only without merit but are 
also without basis in law and fact. Robinson therefore is 
entitled to the benefit of Rule 33(a). 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly granted Robinson's motion 
for summary judgments holding that Beehive's claims were barred 
as a matter of law. The Judgment of the District Court should 
be affirmed in its entirety. Moreover9 inasmuch as Beehive's 
claims are without merit and without basis in law or fact, this 
Court should award Robinson attorneys' fees incurred in 
responding to this appeal. 
DATED this / ^ day of February, 1988. 
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